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ABSTRACT
Three specific aspects of the corporate financing decision —internal
versus external funds, equity versus debt within the external component, arid
features of the debt including especially maturity —presentopportunities
(and pitfalls) for public policy for affecting U.S. capital formation.
First, by reducing the government's dissaving and hence its claims on
the economy's financial resources, policy can make credit market funds available
for corporations to finance their investment externally, thereby both stimulat-
ing the overall amount of capital formation and also taking advantage of the
allocative efficiency of the competitive market mechanism to achieve a produc-
tive composition of that capital formation. At the same time, by using the tax
system to augment the rate of return on corporate—sector assets, policy can
also enable corporations better to compete for such funds once they are available.
Second, by eliminating or even reversing the current tax discrimination
in favor of debt, policy can encourage corporations to rely at least in part
on equities in their external financing, thereby reducing the economy's
aggregate-level financial risk.
Third, by neutralizing or even reversing the current emphasis on long—
term securities in managing the federal government's own debt, policy can
encourage corporations to issue long— instead of short—term debt instruments,
thereby further reducing aggregate-level financial risk. Along the same lines,
policy can also play a role in pioneering markets for new financial instruments,
like bonds providing protection of the investor's purchasing power, that







FINANCING CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE 1980s: ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Benjamin M. Friedman*
Increased American capital formation has emerged as a nearly undisputed
objective of economic policy for the 1980s. Dissatisfaction with the U.S.
economy's poor productivity performance in the l97Os, as well as with the
erosion of international competitiveness that began much earlier but also
became more evident in the 1970s with the dramatic declines in the internation-
al exchange value of the dollar, has elevated what was once largely a business
interest into a much more widely shared goal. In today's environment groups
representing labor and consumers also recognize the need for capital investment
to create jobs and to raise productivity and hence the population's overall
standard of living. On the whole, public discussion has moved from whether
more capital formation is desirable to what policies can best achieve it.
An important aspect of capital formation that this discussion has
often overlooked, however, is its explicitly financial side. In an economy
like that of the United States, each decision to create more physical capital
necessarily has a financial counterpart. This financial counterpart may be
a single transaction, but in an economy with highly developed financial
markets it is more likely to be an entire chain of obligations and transfers
leading from an ultimate saver to an ultimate investor. In the end the
financial and nonfinancial systems interact so that the allocation of the
economy's real resources —whether to make consumer goods or producer goods,
for example, or how much and what kind of each —exactlycorresponds to its
allocation of financial resources.
The financial aspect of the capital formation process is especially—2—
important in a public policy context for two reasons. First, thefinancial
transactions associated with capital formation are not merely a reflection of
real resource allocations that would necessarily come about in any case.
The setting in which the financing of capital formation takes place canalso
be a key determinant of real resource allocations, including not only the
total amount of capital formation but also its composition. The financial
and the nonfinancial elements of the process jointly determine one another,
and public policy may affect the ultimate outcome by influencing either.
Indeed, financial aspects of private capital formation decisions, like afirm's
after-tax borrowing costs, may be much more readily subject to public policy
influence than physical aspects like the production rates of the latestmachine
models.
A second reason why the financial side of capital formation is so
important for public policy is that, when financial markets are asfully
integrated into the economy's life pulse as they are in theUnited States,
fragility of the financial structure can pose major hazards forthe entire
economic system. Moreover, there are sound. reasons for believing thatthe
considerations determining the actions of individual financial market partici-
pants do not adequately reflect potential threats to the system asa whole
from too brittle a financial structure at the aggregate level.Financial
structure is therefore a kind of "public good" in the familiar sensethat
an individual's (or individual firm's) actions bear"externalities" potentially
affecting everyone else. Because there is no reason for the presenceof
such externalities to affect directly the decisions of individualfinancial
market participants, there is a role for public policy in providingincentives
that will in the end lead to a more satisfactory aggregatefinancial structure.
The object of this paper is to consider, from the financial perspective,—3—
both the setting of and the prospects for Pxnerican capital formation in the
l980s, and to focus in particular on the opportunities (and pitfalls) for
public policy. Section I reviews the evolution of investment and saving in
the United States during the last quarter—century and emphasizes the connection
between the allocation of physical and financial resources. Section II examines
in detail the financing of investment through the economy's nonfinancialcorpor-
ate business sector, which historically has accounted for nearly three—quarters
of all U.S. investment in plant and equipment. Section III develops more
fully the concept of externalities associated with private financial actions
and the resulting role for public policy. Section IV focuses on three specific
aspects of corporate financing decisions —internalversus external funds,
equity versus debt within the external component, and the maturity of the
debt —andidentifies in each case the issues for public policy. Section V
provides a brief summary of the paper's principal conclusions.—4—
I. Physical Capital Formation and Financial Capital Formation
The principal development that has spurred interest in increased U.S.
capital formation as a goal for the 1980s has been the economy's deteriorating
productivity performance, in conjunction with its declining rate of net invest-
ment in productive plant and equipment. The productivity of labor in the U.S.
nonfarm private business sector increased by 2.6% per annum during 1948—65,
and 2.2% per annum during 1965-73, but only 0.6% per annum duringl973_79.1
Although neither 1978 nor 1979 was a recession year, labor productivitydeclined
absolutely in both, marking the first two-year continuous productivity fall
in U.S. postwar history. With a recession in 1980, productivity has now
declined for still a third successive year.
In principle, any or all of a number of potential explanations may
help to account for the U.S. productivityslowdown.2 There is evidence that
the rate of technical progress has slowed, probably as a result of the trend
away from research and development activities undertaken by industry.There
is also evidence that both capital and labor resources have become less
mobile, and hence less able to adapt to changing technologies and consumer
tastes. Demographic factors were rendering the labor force progressively
younger, and hence less experienced and less skilled,until the very end of
the 1970s. Government regulation has added increased burdens to production,
importantly so in many industries. Slower output growth per se also typically
exerts downward pressure on productivity, and the 1970s were a recession—
prone, slow—growth era, at least in comparisonwith the l960s.3
The increased attention to the nation's capital formation rate, how-
ever, has brought into a single focus the role of capital —thatis, plant
and equipment —inthe basic production of goods and services. Although
economists investigating the production process have often found the role of—5—
capital frustratingly difficult toquantify, both economic theory and empir-
ical evidence make clear that fixedcapital is essential to production in the
modern economy.4 Table 1 shows theexperience of investment in plant and
equipment in the United States during the
past quarter-centu, by five—year
spans (as well as for the single year 1980, to indicate
the starting point
for today's policy environment). Thetable shows not Only gross investment
in plant and equipment but also thecorresponding net investment after subtrac-
tion of capital consumption allowancesadjusted to reflect true economic
depreciation. The table shows these totals bothin absolute dollar amounts
and as percentages of gross nationalproduct in each year.
The experience reviewed in the bottompanel of Table 1 in particular
suggests clearly why capital formation has receivedincreased attention as
the economy's productivity performancehas slipped during the l970s.Although
gross investment in plant and equipment has moved to
a progressively larger
share of the nation's totalgross national product, the corresponding net
investment has shown a sharp reversal sincethe late l960s. Indeed, by the
late l970s the share of totaloutput devoted to net investment in plant and
equipment was almost back to the level of thelate l950s, and the growth rate
of the capital stock had fallen back
accordingly. In light of the economy's
declining net capital formation rate, it ishardly surprising that the
amount of capital available to eachemployed u.s. worker has actually declined
since 1974 after rising steadily at3% per annum during the previoustwenty-
five years.
Moreover, even the dramatic decline in the net investment rate shown
in these statistics may understate the true extent of theeffective reduction
in the economy's productive capital investment. Onereason is that at least
part of net capital outlays in recent years have gone into special investments
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































not otherwise increase capacity to produce the itemsincluded in conventional
measures of output and productivity. In addition, thesharply higher price
of energy relative to the prices of other inputs tothe production process
(especially labor) has changed the appropriate mix of thoseinputs to be used,
so that substantial amounts of labor-saving butenergy—consuming capital are
no longer economical.5
Increasing the economy's investment rate is, at one level, a matter
of the allocation of real resources. Although additionalcapital increases
the economy's productive capacity once it is availablefor use, in the short
run resources are fixed, and devoting more toany one use means devoting less
to something else. Devoting a larger share ofoutput to business fixed invest-
ment than the 1980 level of 11.3% would require devotinga smaller share to
consumer spending (63.7% in 1980), or to purchases of goods and servicesby
federal or state and local governments (7.6% and 12.8%,respectively), or
to residential investment (4.0%).6
Increasing the economy's investment rate is also a matter of the alloca-
tion of financial resources, however. An importantkey to understanding the
functioning of any economy is the truism that, on an ex post basis, the
economy's saving must equal its investment. Since it is unlikely in a decen-
tralized market economy that ex ante plans for saving and investmentwill
precisely balance one another, the market mechanism must influence the decisions
of businesses and consumers so as to change these inconsistentex ante plans
into consistent ex post actions. Financial marketsplay a large role in this
mechanism, generating adjustments in the real yield which the marketpays
to savers as suppliers of funds and in the cost and availability factors which
confront those who demand funds to invest in productive plant andequipment,
office buildings, inventories, and residential construction. Ifplans to—7—
supply funds exceed plans to demand funds,the market excess leads to increased
availability and a decline in yields. If plansto supply funds fall short
of plans to demand funds, the market shortageleads to reduced availability
and higher yields. The result is that, ex post,saving equals investment.
The function of the financial markets goeseven further, however.
The individuals or institutjOfl5 that seekto do investment, in the sense of
forming new physical capital, are often
not the same as those that wish to
do saving, in the sense of spendingless on current consumption thanthe
limit their income would permit. It isalso the job of the financial markets
to transfer available savings fromthose who have an excess out of income
to those who have a deficiency becausethey are currently undertakinginvest-
ment for the future. No doubt thefinancial markets perform many other impor-
tant functions as well —forexample, providing liquidity and ahost of trans-
actions-oriented services —butfrom the standpoint of their rolein guiding
the mainstream of economic activitythe equilibration of total savingand total
investment, and the transfer of availableresources from savers to investors,
constitute their main activity.
Moreover, these two functions arehardly independent, in that the
amount of saving and investing thatindividuals and institutions do often
depends on the facility of thefinancial markets in executing the relevant
transfer. If the financial markets accomplish
this transfer in an efficient
way that delivers to saversmuch of the total return availablefrom investment,
then, other things equal, the amountof income saved (and, oncetransferred,
devoted to investment) will typicallybe larger. 1lternativelY, if thefinancial
markets do not function efficiently, SOthat much of the return availablefrom
investment does not find its way to savers,then, other things equal, theshare
of output devoted to investmentwill probably be smaller.—8—
Table 2 shows the balance ofsaving and investment in the United
States during the past twenty—fiveyears, scaled in relation to thegross
national product as in the lowerpanel of Table 1. It is clear from the
table that during this periodthere has been no trend at all inthe economy's
total gross saving or totalgross investment (which equals totalgross saving,
except for statistical discrepancy) incomparison to total income andspending.
The 15-16% range has heldremarkably steady throughout.7
Several important changes haveoccurred, however. Behind the steadi-
ness of the total gross saving
rate, the gross private saving rate has shown
some tendency to increase whilegovernment as a whole has moved from aneutral
position to that of persistentdissaving. Within the private sector,capital
consumption allowances have risen, even afteradjustment to reflect the true
economic depreciation, so as toaccount for essentially all of the increase
in the gross private savingrate. Personal saving as a share ofgross national
product has varied irregularly, asmovements in the rate of personalsaving
out of disposable personal income havesometimes offset and sometimescompounded
movements in the share of gross national
product represented by disposable
income itself. Undistributed
corporate profits have increased in relation
to gross national productduring the l970s, but here essentially allof the
increase has consisted of artificial
profits due to price inflation for firms
treating inventories on a first—in-first-outbasis. Within the government
sector, continually growing surplusesamong state and local governments
(consolidated to include retirementfunds) have offset about half of the
growing deficits at the federal level.8
Because of the key role played by thefederal governmentts dissaving
in affecting the economy's overallbalance of saving and investment, it is
useful to focus on this one development in





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































federal government expenditures haverisen steadily as a share ofgross
national product over the lastquarter_century, from 18.4% during 1956—60
to 22.0% during 1976-80. This relativegrowth of federal expenditures has
itself reflected the net result of
two sharp but opposing trends, as federal
purchases of goods and services have
represented a steadily declining share
of gross national product (from 11.2%to 7.3%) and federal transferpayments
a steadily rising share (6.0% to 12.9%).Both the goods and services purchases,
which represent the govermnnt'sown use of economic resources, and the trans-
fers, which represent the government'sredirection of claims on these resources
within the private economy, must befinanced.
The federal government's receipts fromtaxes and Social Security
contributions have also increased in relationto the overall economy over
these years, but only from 18.4% ofgross national product during 1956—60
to 20.0% during 1976—80. The shortfallfrom the corresponding growth of
federal expenditures, shown in Table 2as a steadily growing negative surplus,
has therefore represented a directabsorption of the private saving available
to finance investment. To the extent thatthe government itself has undertaken
investment activities, however including either infrastructure investments
like highways and bridges, ordirectly productive investments like hospitals
and power facilities —thefamiliar private investment data shown in Table2
understate the economy's overall investmenttotal.
On the gross investment side in Table 2, theone clear trend during this
period has been the increasing share ofoutput devoted to gross investment in
plant and equipment, as already indicated inTable 1. Apart from the typically
cyclical characteristics of the single year 1980, whichdepressed homebuilding
and induced an inventory run—off, there has been littletrend in the other
two components of private domestic investment.Finally, net foreign invest——10—
ment —thatis, the excess of U.S. investmentabroad over foreign investment
in the United States —became
negative in the late 1970s, sothat in recent
years (except for1980) U.S. savers have had to
finance less than all of U.S.
domestic investment, instead of havingto finance more than allof it as in
earlier years.
The balance of saving andinvestment (again, except forstatistical
discrepancy) shown in Table 2makes clear the sense inwhich increasing the
economy's overall investmentrate involves the allocationof financial as
well as real resources. An
increased investment rate also meansan increased
saving rate. In the absenceof an infusion of foreign saving(in other words,
a more negative net foreigninvestment position), increased
investment would
require either more private—sectorsaving or less government—sectordissaving,
or both. Moreover, thelargest component ofcorrectly measured private saving,
adjusted capital consumption
allowances, are in effect givenby the economic
depreciation of the existingcapitalstock.9 Hence any increase in private
saving would have to comefrom personal saving orundistributed corporate
profits (adjusted for inventory
profits), both of which havefluctuated only
within a fairly narrow range duringthe last quarter_century.—11—
II. Focus on the Corporate Sector
In the U.S. economy many kinds of institutionsas well as individuals
undertake investment in plant and equipment, but the dominantsource of this
investment has traditionally been incorporated firmsdoing business in nonfinan-
cial industries including manufacturing, naturalresource extraction, trans-
portation, communication, and public utilities and other nonfinancial services.
As Table 3 shows, nonfinancial business corporations haveconsistently accounted
for nearly three—fourths of all U.S. plant and equipment investment.No other
single readily identifiable group has even accounted for as muchas 10% of the
total —althoughthe miscellaneous category, presumably a catch-all for individuals
and unincorporated firms apart from farms, hasconsistently represented some
10-15%. While the remaining one—fourth of investment ishardly unimportant,
any major increase in U.S. fixed investment activity is likely in
large part to involve the nonfinancial corporate business sector.
Just as the corporate sector bulks large in the nation's totalplant
and equipment investment, investing in plant and equipmentrepresents a large
share of the corporate sector's activity. As Table 4 shows, nonfinancial
business corporations typically use far more funds for physical investment
than for financial investment, and plant and equipment isby far the dominant
focus among corporate—sector physical investments)0 The table also shows
that the increase in total U.S. plant and equipment investmentas a share
of gross national product indicated in Table 1 has been entirely due to
the corporate sector. The increase from 9.8% of the nation'soutput devoted
to gross investment in plant and equipment in the late l950s to 11.0% in the
late l970s has simply reflected the corresponding increase from 6.9% to 8.1%













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Like any other entity within the economy,
nonfinancial business corpor-
ations can use funds for investment orother purposes only to the extentthat
they either have these fundsavailable internally or find external sources.
As Table 5 shows, until the latel970s the corporate sector increasingly
financed its investment in physical andfinancial assets by raising external
funds.(The total sources of funds in Table5 differs from the total usesof
funds in Table 4 by a statistical discrepancywhich over time grows about
in pace with the size of the corporatesector, and which representsunreported
uses of funds.) Internally generated
funds accounted for more thantwo—thirds
of all corporate—sector sources of
funds in the late l950s but little more
than one—half in the early l970s, asthe percentage reliance on external
sources steadily rose. Inaddition, close inspection of theunderlying year—
by-year data suggests thatthe reversal of this trend in thelate l970s has
largely reflected the aftermathof the unusually severe 1973—75recession
as well as the brief recessionin 1980.
Among corporations' internal sourcesof funds, both undistributed
profits and capital consumption
allowances rose 5bstantially throughoutthe
1956-80 period in absolute terms, butuntil the late 1970s neither rose
rapidly enough in comparisonwith the surge in external fundsto maintain
the initial two-thirds internal share.Moreover, throughout this periodan
ever larger share of reported profits
consisted of artificial inventory profits.
Further, even in the late 1970s capitalconsumption allowances continuedto
increase more slowly than total sourcesof funds, and hence fell forthe
first time below two-fifths of total sources.
The corporate sector's external sourcesof funds have consisted
almost entirely of debt. Despitethe existence in the United Statesof the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































together with a welldeveloped investment banking
industry capable of under-
writing and j5trjbutiflg primary
issues of new securities,nonfinancial business
corporations have
consistently determined the
equity/debt mix of theirsources
of funds almost entirely
according to theinternal/externalmix.11 In addition,
during the period ofenlarged equity issuing
activity in the early1970s and again
in 1980, many of the newequities issued weretypically preferred shares(which
are essentially equivalentto debt except for the
tax treatment)' and eventhen
one industry (publiC
utilities) accounted for muchof the total.
Hence the corporatesector's ever increasingreliance Ofl external
funds until the late 1970sreally amounted to anjncreasiflg reliance ondebt.
Within the various categoriesof corporate debt, however,
the late 1970s
slowdown relative to the growthof total sources involved
only the bonds and
mortgages and the(mostly jnter_compafly)
trade debt. Since 1975nonfinancial
business corporations have
actually increased their percentage
reliance Ofl
(largely shortterl1l) "otherdebt," including mostlybank loans and commercial
paper, thereby
renewing a trend that hasnow prevailed throughoutthe past
twenty—five years except
for a brief interruption
during the earlyl970S.1
In the same way that an
increase in the economy'soverall investment
rate would require an
increase in its savingrate, in the absenceof a reduction
in its financial investment
an increase in thecorporate sector's useof funds
for investment in plantand equipment would require
an increase in itsinternal-
ly generated funds or
its external funds, orboth. If past patternsof financing
continue, then an increasein internal funds wouldimply additional reliance
on equity, while anincrease in externalfunds would implyadditional reliance
on debt. At leastin principles however, an
increase in externalfunds could
mean debt or equity, justas whatever additionaldebt corporations issuedcould
consist of either long— orshort—term instruments.—14—
III. Financial Structure asa Public Good
Almost any kind of financialsystem is capable of transferringresources
from ultimate savers to ultimate
investors. The special feature ofcompetitive
financial markets is that, inso doing, they also perform animportant alloca—
tive function. At theaggregate level the market mechanism determinesthe
overall amount of the economy'sincome to be saved, and hence theoverall
amount of its output to be devoted to
augmenting the physical capital stock.
At the underlying level of themicro-unit, the same process enablesa multi-
tude of individuals and institutionsto allocate the total amount savedand
invested efficiently
among countless potentially productive projects.13
This key role in efficiently
allocating the economy's scarce resources
constitutes the fundamental rationale
underlying the very existence of competi—
tive financial markets. In
centrally planned economies, for example, thefiat
approach is also generally capable ofcommandeering resources from various
sources and transferring them to designatedapplications. Without competitive
markets, however, the efficiency of theresulting resource allocation rests
entirely on the centralized informationgathering and decision making process.'4
By contrast, a competitive marketsystem utilizes each individual market
participant's information (and preferences) inarriving at the prices of
and yields on the fullrange of financial assets and liabilites. Theseprices
and yields in turn provide thesignals and incentives that induce individual
savers to direct their savings toward theultimate real investments that the
market as a whole considers most valuable.
When individuals (or the intermediaryagents acting in their behalf)
decide which firm's equities tobuy, or to which firm to lend via securities
or other loan arrangements, they doso on the basis of the prospects for return
and the apparent risks associated withthat firm's equities or debt claims.—15—
For firms in nonfinancial businesses,however, the prospective returns and
risks associated with its securities mostlyreflect the returns and risks
associated with the firm's underlying realactivity, based on its physical
assets, its human resources, its organization,and other features of its
business. If a firm's managers believethat it can expand in ways that will
generate unusually high returns,
even after allowance for risk, theywill
be prepared to pay a greater than average
return in order to attract financial
resources. If savers (or their agents)similarly assess the firm's prospects,
they will advance financial resourcesto the firm on that basis. Because
the economy's overall financial resourcesare scarce, mirroring the scarcity
of real resources, each firm's ability
to attract funds to finance its expan-
sion necessarily limits the expansionof other firms. By ilocatingfinancial
resources in this way, the competitivemarket system ultimately determines
not just the overall rate but alsothe specific directions of the economy's
real expansion.
The efficiency of the financial resourceallocation process —and
hence of the economy's chosen growth path—isnot a matter of concern to
the individual saver or to any one firm,however. The nature of a competitive
system is that each participant pursuesonly his own objectives, yetin so
doing contributes to the establishmentof signals and incentives which steer
all participants in the direction thatbest contributes to the efficiencyof
the overall outcome. For the systemto operate effectively, therefore, any
aspect of individual decision making
that matters for the overall outcome
should also influence the prices and yields
to which the individual decisions
respond. If financial decisions atthe level of the micro—unit bear aggregate
level implications that these pricesand yields do not reflect, thenthe result-
ing "externality" will preventthe system from directing individualfinancial—16—
decisions so as to
Constitute, in total, the mostefficient overall outcome.
The primary area in whichmodern financial marketsmay be subject
to such externality
problems is that of risk.To be sure, marketparticipants
acutely analyze the risks
associated with any specificindividual borrower
or firm raising either debtor equity funds, and theyield or prospective
return set by the marketas a whole in Principle does
reflect such risks
in each case.
Moreover, the market tends toprice these risks inways that
sYstematically vary between individualsand business firms,among both individ-
uals and firmsaccording to a rich variety of
criteria, and from onestage
of the economic cycle to another.15What the financial
markets may not price,
however, is the collectiverisk to the economyas a whole associated notwith
any individual borrower's debt
per se but, instead, with theeconomy—wide
aggregate debt position.
In industrially advancedeconomies with highlydeveloped financial
markets, a complex financialstructure typicallysupports most real activities
including especially the basicbusiness sector. As isclear in Table 5,
nonfinancial businesscorporations in the United States
typically finance
much of the expansion of
their productive plantand equipment byraising
external funds in the debt
markets. Moreover, in mostcases these funds caine
not from individuals butfrom intermediaryinstitutions, which in turn raise
their funds by issuing theirown liabilities to individualsor to still further
intermediaries'6 Atevery level of this process, each
market participant's
leverage Position may be
entirely satisfactory in thesense that liabilities
are well in line withassets, yet most participants 'assetsare in reality
just others' liabilities.
The fact that most of theassets are simply someoneelse's liabilities
lends a pyramid, or chain,characteristic to theresulting financial super-—17—
structure. At its base, of course, are physicalassets with real values of
varying degrees of stability, togetherwith presumably default-free claims
on the federal government. Beyondthat base, however, nonfinancial events
causing the default of any one linkin the chain have the effect ofinvalidat-
ing the assets of the next link,and therefore threaten further defaults
due now to financial circumstances.The more complex and interwoven isthe
superstructure in comparison toits underlying base, the greater isthe risk
that such a default situation initiallydue to nonfinancial events could
cumulate, thereby threatening a major ruptureto the system as awhole.17
The implications of aggregate-level
financial risk for the growth of
the economy are related to, but yetdistinct from, the implications ofthe
amount and composition of capital
formation addressed above. Becausethe
devotion to net capital formationof a part of the economy's fixedresources
at any time increases the economy'sfuture productive capacity, theinvest-
ment (and savings) rate is an important
determinant of how fast the economy
grows. Similarly, becausedifferent investment projects makedifferent
contributions to that productive capacity,
the efficiency of any givenamount
of capital formation also mattersfor the economy's growth. Bycontrast,
the economy's overall level offinancial risk matters primarily forthe
variability of economic growth, although
it may affect the average growthrate
also. The effect of a fragile
financial structure on the variabilityof economic
growth was most readily apparentin the United States in thedecades before
World War II, when business fluctuations
that were far more severe than any
in the post—war experience often
followed financial disruptions. Moreover,
if the increased pace of investmentduring business expansionsdoes not com-
pletely make up for theshortfall during contractions, morevariable growth
will mean slower average growth aswell.—18—
As Table 6 shows, in
the United States thetotal amount ofOutstanding debt issued by
nonfinancial borrowers has
grown approximately inpace with
the economy's
nonfinancial activityduring the past twentyfjve
years. Except
for a short period inthe l950s, theeconomy's aggregate nonfincia1debt—
to-income ratio has exhibited
essentially no trend)-8 Within the
stability
of the total, however, the
composition has steadily shiftedtoward greater
private—sector indebtedness, andreduced government_se0indebtedness, rela-
tive to the economy's total
output and spending. Between 1955and 1980 the
combination of some movement in
the overall total and thislarge change in
composition resulted in nonfinancial
private borrowers'outstanding debt
rising from Only two—thirds ofa year's total income to wellover a full
year's income. Althoughsome of this increasemerely reflects the growth
of the nation's physicalcapital stock (including
residential capital) relative
to income, to a largeextent it also indicates
more heavily leveragedfinancing 19 of that capital.
Moreover, in addition to this increasein the private sector'srelative
indebtedness, the financialsystem has continued to becomemore extensively
20 intermediated. The share of total private-sector
holdings of credit market
debt claims accounted for byfinancial intermediaries has risensteadily
during this period, from 69.8% atyear-end 1955 to 81.5% at year—end 1980.21
From the perspective of
aggregate—level risk, therefore, agrowing superstruc-
ture of financial intermediation has
compounded the effect of greater leverage.
Finally, not all kinds of debt liabilities
are equally fragile as
assets in the portfolios of lenders whohold them. Although it is possible
to draw a number of distinctions
among different debt instruments along these















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































maturities is the mostreadily apparent. Here the effectof nonfinancial
business corporations' increasedreliance on short-term debt,as indicated
in Table 5, has ledover time to a steady reduction
in the average maturity
of these corporations iOutstandingdebt. As Table 7 shows, theshort-term
share of U.S. nonfinancial
business corporations'outstanding debt rose from
Only one-fifth of the total atyear—end 1955 to well over one-fourthat
year-end 1980, so that during theseyears the corporate sector'soutstanding
short—term debt more than doubledin relation to gross nationalproduct.
As the combination of
greater leverage, more intermediationand
shorter maturities continueto increase the U.S.economy's aggregate_level
financial risk, theexternality associated with individualfinancial decisions
that do not take this
aggregate_1el risk into account becomes
progressively
more of a problem. The role for
public policy with respect to thenation's
financial markets isaccordingly greater. In addition tousing the financial
system to achieve the amount of
overall capital formationjudged appropriate
on macroeconomic grounds, andprotecting the system's competitiveaspects
so as to promote the efficientallocation of that capital,aGgregate—level
risk represents yet a thirdfocus of public Policy withrespect to the financial
markets. The containment or reductionof this aggragate_lfinancial
risk is, in effect, a "publicgood." Moreover, the morecapital formation
the nation undertakes —andhence the more financing itdoes —themore





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Three distinctaspects of the corporate
financing decision, as illus-
trated in Table 5,
represent areas in which
public pol±y may exertinfluence over the amountandcomposition of capital
formation undertaken inthe United
States, and on the
aggregate_l risk associated
with financing thatcapital
formation: internalversus external funds,
equity versus debt Within the
external component, andfeatures of the debt
including especiallymaturity.
Internal versus ExternalFunds. To the extentthat the competitive
market mechanismrepresents the most efficient
available system forallocating scarce capital
resources, an emphasis on
external sources of fundsto finance
an increased rate of
capital formation wouldbest endure thedirection of that
capital toward thoseindustries, and thosecompanies Within particularindus-
tries, that provide the best
opportunity for Putting the addedcapital to
productive use.Conversely, the more firms
simply redeploy the financial
resources that they
generate internally, Withouthaving to face the market
test in attracting
new capital, the lessrole the competitivemarket system
plays in Promoting efficient
allocations. Similarly, ifgovernme distorts
capital formationaway from market_determined
allocations by means of direct




gathering and decisionmaking system for that of the
financial markets.
A corporation
relying largely on internalfunds is, of course,not
entirely exempt from thejudgment of the market.The market stillprices
the company's shares,and shareholders
seeking improved returnsmay exert
some influence on the firm's
management. In addition, ifthe market places
too low a value on
a corporationis shares,it sometimes becomesattractive
for new
ownership, prepared to provide
new management, toacquire a controlling—21—
interest. Even so, theimperfections of the dominantmodes of corporate
governance suggest
that external funding in
competitive markets islikely
to enhance the efficiencyof business capital formation.
public policy could contribute to promoting
externally financed corpo-
rate capital formation in twocomplementary ways. First,if th corporate sector
is to raise additional
external funds, it is necessarythat those funds be
available. As the balanceof saving and. investment
shown in Table 2 makes
clear, an increase ininvestment not financed byincreased undistribUt
corporate profits (or byreduced residential investmentor a shift to negative
net foreign investment) requires
either an increase in personalsaving or
a reduction in government
dissaving, or both.
Much recent discussionhas focused on taxincentives to stimulate
personal saving by raising
after-tax returns, althoughthe historical varia-
tion of personal saving as
a share of total income(see again Table 2)does
not suggest any clear
connection between such returnsand the personal saving
share.2By contrast, thefederal government's progressively
larger budget
deficits in relation to gross
national product have clearlyabsorbed ever
larger amounts of privatesaving that wouldotherwise have beenavailable
to finance investment.
As Table 8 shows, netfunds raised by thefederal
government have steadilyincreased not just in relationto gross national
product but as a shareof the total fundsraised by all nonfinancialsectors
in the u.s. credit markets.
In addition, the government's
use of its sponsored
financial intermediaries has
jncreasiflgly absorbed stillmore funds, which
these intermediaries thenhave usually passed onto noncorporate borrowers
for purposes other than
investment in plant and equipment.
One major way for publicpolicy to promote
externally financed capital








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































economy's real and financial
resources. Between thelate 1950s and the
late 1970s, the shareof real economic resources
absorbed by the federal
government rose byabout four percent. Because
the government did notfinance
that increase with
increased taxes (and becauseof the growthofgovernment
intermediation), the share oftotal credit market resourcesabsorbed by the
federal goverflmenti either
directly or indirectly, roseby more than eighteen
percent. Reducingthe federal deficit(even if just in relativeterms) would
release these resources,as would reducingthe sponsored creditagencies'
scale of activity.
The mere availabilityof savings, however, doesnot automatically
mean that individuals(or their agents) willbe willing to transferthem
to nonfinancial business
corporations for use infinancing investment in
plant and equipment.Hence a further major
consideration for public policy
along these lines isthe corporate sector's
ability to attractexternal funds.
Corporations must show prospectsof earning a sufficientrate of return on
that investment, after
due allowance for risk,to render such applications
of financial resourcescompetitive.
Hence corporate profitsare hardly beside
the point, even if the
ultimate objective of public
policy is to enhancecapital formation largely
financed from external sources.
Through a combinationof taxation and related
means, policy could helpto reverse the erosionin the after—tax profit-
ability of fixed business
investment, and therebyimportantly affect the
corporate sector's
ability to attract theexternal funds necessaryto finance
additional capital formation.
Equity Versus Debt.Is Table 5 shows,during the past twenty-five
years U.S.
nonfinancial business corporations
have used debt instruments—23—
to raise almost allof their externalfunds,sothat the internal/external
mix of theirfinancing has also largely
determined the equity/debtmix.
The consequence ofthis financing patternhas been the
rising corporate_sector
leverage discussed inSection ii.24 A
substantial increase inexternally
financed capital formationwould only further erodecorporate_sector balance
sheets if this pattern
continued, and the resulting
financial
risk to the economy would
accordingly rise further.
Nevertheless, a corporation15
choice of whether to issuedebt or
equity securities, as wellas a saver's choice of bondsor stocks for his
portfolio, is hardly independent
of public policy influence.The likely
avenues of Policy influence inthis area lie with thetax code's treatment
of the respective costs
and returns associated withdebt and equity instruments.
Probably the greatest suchsingle influence in the UnitedStates in recent
yearshas been the discriminationbetween debt andequity forms of pay—out
at the corporate levelunder the corporateprofit tax.25 Because the tax
codeallows interestpayments (but not dividends)as a deduction fromcorpo-
rate profit taxes, inmost circuInstces acorporation can reduce thetotal
taxes due from its
operations by financing itsassets with debt instead of
equity. Moreover, the interactionof the tax code and
accelerating price
inflation has made thisdiscrimination all the morePowerful in recent years,
as nominal interest rates haverisen to reflect the inflationpremium neces-
sary to compensate lenders for thereduction in the real valueof their
principal.
It is impossible to knowthe extent to which thetax code's discrim-
ination in favor of debtand against equity hasaccounted for the observed
pattern of corporate external
financing. Even so, it is clearthat eliminating
this discrimination wouldat least removecorporations' current disincentive—24—
to finance with equity.
There probably exists noperfect way of competely
neutralizing the tax systemin this regard, but there
has been no shortage
of proposed steps that
would advance this objectiveat least in part. These
ideas have ranged fromsimply abolishing the
distinction between the treat-
ment of interest and
dividend payments at the corporatelevel to fully inte-
grating the corporateand individual income taxsystems. Indexingthe tax
code to eliminate theeffects of inflation, asuggestion often madefor
other purposes too, wouldbe especially relevant
in this context.
Moreover, in light ofthe deterioration incorporate_Sector balance
sheets that has alreadyoccurred, and which would
otherwise continue and
even increase with anenhanced capital formation
rate financed externally,
there is even a case for goingbeyond merely restoringneutrality. Under
the circumstances a positive
incentive in favor of equityfinancing (or,
alternatively, a penalty todebt financing) wouldbe a plausible objective
to guide public policy.
The rationale for thisreverse discriminationlies
in the externality
associated with each individualcorporation's financing
decisions. Although themarket presumablY prices
fully the incrementa]-risk
to the corporation's own
securities associated withadditional borrowing,
there is no way for themarket to price the addedaggregate-level risk
resulting from the further
compounding of the economy'soverall financial
superstructure. To theextent that the containmentor even reductionof
aggregatele1 financial
risk represents a publicgood, positivediscrimin-
ation in favor of equity
financing would be a wayof achieving it.
FeatUre of theDebt. Even if publicpolicy does lead U.S.nonfinan-
cial business corporationsto increase their
historically minimal reliance
on external equity
financing, the major partof the external fundsrequired
to finance any new surgeof corporate capital
formation will almostinevitably—25-.
take the form of debt. To the
extent that considerations ofaggregate_level
risk create greater
externalities when corporations issueone kind of debt
instrument rather thananother, there is again a role forpublic policy in
augmenting the markets' own system of
incentives. In addition, thereis room
for public policy initiativesto broaden the U.S. debtmarkets in ways that
would make debt funds easier
overall for corporations to raise.
In deciding on thematurity of its debt instruments,a typical corpo-
ration takes into account therelative costs of short—versus long-term financing,
including not only currentlyPrevailing interest rates but also itsexpectations
of interest rate movements inthe future. At the simplestlevel, the relevant
comparison is not between today's
twenty—year bond rate and ninety—daypaper
rate, but rather between the bondrate and the (risk-adjusted)expected cost
of renewing short—termpaper for twenty years. In reality thecomparison
is far more complex, becausea decision to issue short-termpaper today still
leaves open the possibility of
issuing long-term bonds in the future.The
available empirical evidenceindicates that, in deciding thematurity of
debt offerings, U.S.corporations respond to interest rateconsiderations
along just these lines.26
The federal government is alsoa borrower in these markets,however,
and evidence suggests that thegovernment has at least some significant
ability to influence the relative interestrates on short- and long-term
instruments by the management of itsown debt.27 Because lenders are not
indifferent to the varying risk characteristicsof securities of dissimilar
maturity, the more the government issues short- instead
of long—term debt,
the higher will be short— relative tolong—term interest rates, and vice versa.
During most of the post World War II era, the federal
government progressively
shortened the average maturity of itsoutstanding debt. The mean maturity
of privately held U.S. Treasurysecurities outstanding fell from 116 months—26—
at year-end 1945 to 71months at year-end 1955,
and only 29 months at year-
end 1975. The net effectof this policy was toreduce long— relative toshort
term interest rates,thereby encouraging corporations
(and others) to finance
with larger maturities.
Since 1975, however, the
government has changedits debt management
policy so as insteadto emphasize long-termissues. By year-end1980 the
mean maturity of privatelyheld Treasury securities
had risen from 29 months
to 45 months, and it
is continuing to rise. Byrais9 long- relativeto
short—term interest rates,the new policy encourages
corpOrati01 to finance
with short maturities.This point is especially
important in an era inwhich,
because of the highlevel and volatile natureof the rate of priceinflation,
fewer lenders are willingto devote major sharesof their portfoliOS to
long—term fixed-incomesecurities.
One way for public policyto pursue the objectiveof 00tainiflg or
reducing aggregate—level
financial risk, therefore,
would be to reverse the
debt management policy
pursued since 1976 —thatis, to return to the policy
which prevailed almost
throughout the first thirty yearsof the postwar era.
Even a neutral debtmanagement policy, whichsimply preserved thecurrent
maturity structure of the0ttanding Trea5U debtinstead of lengthening it,
would prevent the government
from exerting ever greater
pressure on the corpo-
rate sector to finance anincreased capital formation
rate with short-termdebt.
Finally, despite the greatdepth and diversityof the U.S. financial
markets, these marketsmake available only alimited range of vehiclesfor
ansferriflg capital along
the chain from ultimate
savers to ultimateinvestors.
For example, 1thoughprice inflation
and inflatiOfl risk have
continued to be
a major (perhapsthe major) focus of
attention among both borrowersand lenders
in the United Statesfor at least a decade,the market has yet toevolve any—27—
vehicle by which savers canpay a price to transfer inflation risk tosomeone
else.28Similarly, although theasyetry of the conventional call feature
greatly increases the inflation riskto the lender, almost alllong-terTn corpo—
rate bonds issued in the UnitedStates continue to bear the standardcall defer—
ment of either five or ten
years depending upon the business of theborrowing
• 29
corporation.
Often the reason why the financialmarkets are slow in introducingnew
instrents, especially in welldeveloped markets like that in theUnited States
for corporate bonds, is thatno one issuer is prepared topay the cost of pioneer-
ing an innovation. Here, too, thereis an externality in that theset of mar—
ket incentives confronting the
individual decision making unit donot encompass
the full set of benefits (or
costs) attendant on the decision to bemade. A
potential role for public policy insuch circumstances would be toassume the
pioneering role, introducing limitedamounts of particular new kinds of
securities so as to open new markets
that private borrowers could thentap
to raise funds to financecapital formation.—28—
v. summary of COnClUSiOnS
Capital formation implies
the allocation of both physicaland financial
resources. The resulting
constraints apply both to the economyas a whole
and to its individual sectors.
For the overall economy,increased investment
is possible only if thereis increased private-sector
saving or reduced
government-sector dissaving.
For the nonfinancial corporate
business sector,
which accounts for nearly
three—fourths of all U.S. investmentin plant and
equipment, increasedinvestment is possible onlyif corporations generate more
funds internally or raise morefunds externally.
In a system of highlydeveloped competitive financial
markets, several
considerations guide the effortof public policy to promote
increased capital
formation. policy may affect
the total amount of capitalformation undertaken
by influencing privatesaving or by ontrolliflggovernment jssaving.policy
may also enhancethe efficient allocationof that capital formation byprotect-
ing the competitivenature of the financialmarkets. In addition, becausethere
is an externality associated
with the contribution ofindividual financing
decisions to the economy's
aggregate—level financial risk,the containment or
reduction of that risk isitself a public good.
Three specific aspectsof the corporate financing
decision —internal
versus external funds,equity versus debt withinthe external component,and
features of the debt includingespecially maturity —presentopportunities
for public policy aimed
at nhanciflg the nation'scapital formation. First,
by reducing the government's
dissaving and hence itsclaims on the economy's
financial resources, policy can
make credit market fundsavailable for cor-
porations to financetheir investment externally,
thereby both 5tjulatiflg
the overall amount of capital
formation and also takingadvantage of the
allocative efficiency of thecompetitive market mechanismto achieve a produc—29—
tive composition ofthat capital formation.At the same time,by Using the
tax system toaugment the rate of returnon corporate_sector
assets, policy
can also enable
corporations better tocompete for such fundsonce they are
available. Second,by eliminating or even
reversing the current tax discrimin-
ation in favor ofdebt, policy can
encourage corporations torely at least
in part on equitiesin their external
financing, therebyreducing the economy's
financial risk. Third,
by neutralizing oreven reversing the
current emphasis onlong—te securities inmanaging the federalgovernmen'5
own debt, Policy can




risk. Along thesame lines, Policy canalso play a role inPioneering markets
for new financial
instruments, like bonds
Providing protection of theinvestor's
Purchasing power, that privateborrowers can thenuse to finance privatecapital formationFootnotes
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1. These data are fromu.s. Council ofEconomic Advisers[281.
2. See Kendrick [20]for an analysis ofthese factors, jncludingan effort
to quantify theirrespective contributions.
3. See Gordon [151for an analysis ofthe effect of outputgrowth on productivity
in a cyclical time frame.
4. See Lucas [22] foran early reviewof the literature ofempirical production
functions, with emphasisOfl the difficultyin empiricallyjndentifying
the contribution of
capital. For a morerecent example of thisproblem
in an applied policy
context, see Perry [261.
5. See Jorgenson [191for an analysis ofthe influence ofrelative prices
on production and
prodUctivity in thecontext of the post-l973rise
in energy prices.
6. The remaining majorspending categoriesof the gross nationalproduCts
inventory accumulationand net exports, are
probably not subjectto policy
decisions in thiscontext.
7. The single—year high
and low were, respectivY
16.6% (1965) and13.4% (1958)
for total gross saving
and 17.3% (1956) and
13.8% (1958) for total gross
investment.
8. The appearance from
the table that thefederal deficit for1980 was the
largest in relationto gross national product
during the 1956-80 period
is misleading, however.
In fact the relative
deficit was larger in1975
and 1976 (4.5% and 3.1%,
respectively) and in 1958(3.0%).
9. The fact thatadjusted capital
consumption allowances aregiven does not
mean that allowable








11. During three yearsin the 1960snonfinancial businesscorporations' total
net equity issuance wasactually negative, as
repurchases exceeded gross
new issues.
12. In fact the
interruption was limitedto the two years
1975-76, and was
almost certainly a
reflection of the1973—75 recession.13. See Bauinol [1] for
a classic description of thisprocess in the context of the equity market. Muchof Baurnol's analysis appliesto the debt markets as well.
14. See Bergson [21 foran analysis of the equivalentof "profits" incentrally planned Systems.
15. See Jaffee [18] foran analysis of the variation in riskpremiums on debt securities.
16. For example, amanufacturing firmmayborrow from a bank, which issuesa certificate of deposit to amoney market fund, which issues shares toan individual. Such chainsmay involve many more transactions, ofcourse.
17. Minsky's work hasemphasized this aspect of the distinctionbetween gross debt and net debt;
see, for example, Minsky [24, 25]. See alsoKindleberger [211 for a lively historical
account in support of this idea.
18. See Friedman [12] foran analysis of the debt-toincome
stability phenomenon, and Friedman riij fora descriptive overview of the behavior of the debt-to-incomeratio since 1918.
19. See again Friedman [12],especially Figure 3.
20. See Gurley and Shaw [16]and Goldsmith [13, 14] foranalyses of the relation- ship between increasing levels offinancial intermediation and thedevelop- ment of the economy.
21. These data are from theBoard of Governors of the FederalReserve System.
22. As Feldstein [7] has
explained, in principle the effect ofhigher returns could either increase or reducesaving. See Boskiri [5] and Howrey andHyrnans [17] for differing views of theempirical evidence on this question.
23. The concept of "profits"that matters in this context isthe rate of return gross of interest payments. See Feldstein
arid Summers [8] for estimates of the U.S. corporate sector's
gross and net rates of return during recent years.
24. See Ciccolo [6] for a carefulanalysis of changes in the U.S. corporate
sector's balance sheet since early in thiscentury.
25. See McLure [23] for acomprehensive review of the U.S.corporate tax structure in this context.
26. See Friedman [9].
27. See Roley [27].
28. See Bodie [3] for a detailedanalysis of the inflation risk associated
with different kinds of securities inthe United States, and Friedman [10] for a set of internationalcomparisons.
29.SeeBodje and Friedman [4]foran analysis ofthecall feature on U.S. corporate bonds.References—
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